











# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## Monterey, California



# THESIS

INVESTIGATING THE FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING  
A NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE RATING

by

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Investigating The Feasibility of Establishing  
A Naval Special Warfare Rating

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
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## ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the feasibility of creating a Naval Special Warfare (NSW) rating. It discusses the history and evolution of the NSW community, as well as the mission and training of NSW enlisted personnel. It delves into the manpower requirements of Seal teams, which comprise the majority of enlisted personnel within the NSW community, and evaluates existing manpower models within the Navy with the intent of modifying an existing model to accommodate Seal team manpower requirements. A recent approved expansion by the Chief of Naval Operations of NSW billets for POM 86 is addressed, as well as how the expansion affects the NSW community. Historical data concerning the creation of a NSW rating is discussed, and arguments for and against the creation of a NSW rating are evaluated.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. PURPOSE

The Naval Special Warfare (NSW) community originated during World War II to chart hydrographic information for amphibious landings, and has evolved into a community that requires many special skills to be used in a variety of combat situations. Throughout this evolution no rating was ever established to consolidate the specific skills required for conducting NSW operations. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the possibility of creating an NSW rating by evaluating the manpower needs of the NSW community. The first chapter addresses the history, evolution, mission, and training of the enlisted personnel in the NSW community, and identifies some problems that have developed within the NSW community. Subsequent chapters address manpower standards within the Navy and how they relate to Seal team requirements; current and future billet structure in the NSW community; and historical information regarding the development of a NSW rating. Because the development of a rating affects the enlisted personnel only, training and manpower requirements for officers are not addressed in this study.

## B. HISTORY

On November 20, 1942, the United States became painfully aware of the need for combat swimmers. On that day, during the amphibious invasion of the Japanese held island of Tarawa, tragedy struck. A submerged reef caused the Marine-laden landing craft to stop far off shore, forcing their occupants to wade several hundred yards to the beach. To the heavily laden invaders, submerged depressions and holes became as lethal as enemy bullets. [Ref. 1]

This experience indicated a need to provide comprehensive pre-assault hydrographic information, including the location and, if required, destruction of natural and/or man-made obstacles. [Ref. 2]

To accomplish this task, Navy Combat Demolition Units were formed. The first units consisted of personnel gathered from Navy Construction Battalions and Navy/Marine Scout and Raider Volunteers. [Ref. 3]

The training was extremely rigorous and demolition work was emphasized. Methods were developed for demolishing the type of obstacles expected at Normandy and Omaha beaches. The Navy Combat Demolition Unit men did not anticipate any swimming, for the clearance was to be conducted at low tide. They wore hooded, canvas firefighting suits, with field shoes and long stockings. A protective mask covered the bare parts of the face; this protective clothing was in anticipation of a spray of mustard gas. [Ref. 4]

The casualties inflicted by the enemy during the European invasion using this technique were extremely high, however. A different concept was developed for the Pacific waters, where personnel swam in during high tide to conduct underwater reconnaissance and place demolition on any obstacles. The teams were then redesignated the Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT). [Ref. 5]

After the war, in 1946, the 34 Underwater Demolition Teams were combined into 6 large teams for purposes of demobilization. [Ref. 6]

During the Korean conflict, the skills and techniques of the UDT were once again required, and in September, 1950, the UDT took part in the major amphibious landing at Inchon. During this conflict the UDT mission was expanded, and in addition to the primary job of beach reconnaissance, UDT conducted many night demolition raids against enemy bridges, railway tunnels, and similar targets. UDT also proved invaluable as human minesweepers in the restricted waters of the Korean harbors and rivers. UDT men in a line abreast would swim through a channel attaching time-delay destructors to the mines as they found them. [Ref. 7]

President Kennedy foresaw a continuing need for Special Warfare type operations, and on 1 January 1962, commissioned Seal Teams One and Two. [Ref. 8]

Seal team's are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct unconventional warfare, counter-guerrilla, and

clandestine operations in maritime areas and riverine environments; this includes, but is not limited to, the following: demolitions, intelligence collecting, and training and advising friendly military and paramilitary forces in the conduct of Naval Special Warfare. [Ref. 9]

In May 1983, the existing UDT teams were redesignated to Seal team or Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (SDV) teams.

Currently there are six Seal teams and two SDV teams.

The SDV teams consist of Seal operators who are further trained to drive, navigate, and maintain the Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (SDV). Because the nature of the SDV mission is somewhat different from that of a Seal team, this analysis will only include SDV teams when speaking about the aggregate numbers of the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) community but will concentrate specifically on the manpower problems associated with Seal teams.

### C. MISSION

Seals are enlisted volunteers who are highly trained, highly motivated male personnel who are tasked with maintaining the capability to do the following:

1. Destroy enemy shipping, harbor facilities, bridges, railway lines, and other installations in maritime areas and riverine environments.
2. Infiltrate and/or exfiltrate agents, guerrillas, evaders, and escapees.
3. Conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and other intelligence.



4. Accomplish limited counter-insurgency civic action tasks which are normally incidental to counter guerrilla operations; possibilities include medical aid, elementary civil engineering activities, boat operations and maintenance, and basic education of the indigenous population.
5. Organize, train, assist, and advise the United States, Allied, and other friendly military or paramilitary forces in the conduct of the above tasks.

Seals must also maintain the professional skills of the now extinct UDT teams. These skills include the reconnaissance and clearances of man-made or natural obstacles of the areas from the 6 1/2 fathom curve (21 feet of depth) to the high water mark on a prospective landing beach. [Ref. 10]


#### D. TRAINING

Enlisted Seals are recruited from Navy "Boot Camp" and the "Fleet". To qualify for Seal training entry personnel must not be older than 30 and have an Arithmetic Reasoning (AR) plus Word Knowledge (WK) score on the ASVAB of not less than 110. Physically they must pass a combination swimming, physical training, and running screening test.


After qualifying for training, enlisted personnel must complete a gruelling 26 week course. Training includes physical conditioning, small boat operations, small unit tactics, open and closed circuit diving, weapons handling, and demolitions. After the 26 week course is completed personnel are sent to jump school to learn static line

parachute techniques. Upon reporting to the team, the individual is placed in a six month probationary status and must complete a Personnel Qualification Standard (PQS) program before receiving a Secondary Navy Enlisted Classification Code (SNEC). Once he receives this code the individual indicates what department he prefers, i. e. Communications, Diving, Ordinance, etc. Once indicated, he is sent to additional schools to become specialized in that area. For example, a person preferring to work in the Air Department is sent to a four month parachute rigger school, whereas someone preferring Engineering department would attend two week outboard motor repair school. Figure 1 illustrates the composition of a Seal team.

Upon completion of the desired school, the individual will then be assigned to a platoon, where he will be the specialist in maintaining and operating the equipment for that department. A platoon consists of two officers and 14 enlisted personnel. Figure 2 portrays the personnel required to compose a Seal platoon. Although the medical representative, or a hospital corpsman (HM), assigned to the teams and subsequently the platoons is an enlisted person, he is different than the other enlisted personnel. He has received medical training and is designated an HM prior to entering the basic Seal training. Therefore if he completes the basic Seal training he will automatically be assigned to the medical department upon reporting to the team, and he



Composition of a Seal Team  
Figure 1



Composition of a SEAL Platoon  
Figure 2

will subsequently be assigned as the platoon's medical representative.

#### E. PROBLEM

Because of the evolutionary nature of receiving volunteers from the Navy into the UDT and Seal teams, no Navy rating was ever created for the UDT/Seal personnel. The result of this is that Seals are evaluated not against other Seals, but against their counterparts in the Fleet within the same rating. Consequently, there is no limit to the number of personnel that may be advanced. This has created a manning excess of E-8 and E-9 Seal personnel. Currently Seals are over 200% manned in the E-8 and E-9 categories [Ref. 11]. Because Seals have diverse ratings, when they prepare for advancement exams they study manuals in their particular ratings. This detracts from their professional competence, for they should be studying manuals that emphasize their professional skills such as diving, parachuting, and demolition. The problem is exacerbated when one looks at the equipment that is currently in Seal team's inventory. For in a Seal team, just as in the rest of the Armed Forces, equipment is getting much more complex and sophisticated, and it requires more expertise by personnel working on it than it ever has in the past. Scuba rigs that cost \$15,000 each and can maintain a constant partial pressure of oxygen down to 150 feet are now in Seal



team's inventory along with Laser Target Identifiers and Night Vision Goggles. Technology is quickly advancing and equipment that is not maintained properly will cost the Seal team's thousands of dollars and, if ruined, may not be easily replaced. Consequently, any time that detracts from a Seal's primary mission emphasis--such as studying for examinations on equipment not associated in the least with Seal team's mission--deleteriously affects the professional competence of an individual and subsequently detracts from the overall achievement of a Seal team's mission.

Therefore, a careful analysis of the possibility of creating a Seal rating is warranted. The present effort will address current manpower authorizations under existing systems and future manpower growth. The advantages and disadvantages of creating a NSW rating will be compared using some historical arguments and updating them to make them relevant to today's situation.

## II. MANPOWER STANDARDS

### A. INTRODUCTION

Before analyzing whether or not a Seal rating is necessary, an analysis of Seal Team's manning requirements should be conducted. This analysis will determine qualitative and quantitative manpower requirements for each team, which would be the cornerstone of manpower requirements for the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) community. NSW billets for enlisted personnel encompass not only the eight teams but also other commands such as the NSW Training Department of the Naval Amphibious Base, Naval Experimental Diving Unit, the two NSW Group Staffs, overseas Naval Special Warfare Units, as well as others.

The logical way of determining these manpower requirements is to use the Naval Manpower Engineering Program (NAVMEP), which is designed to determine individual command requirements throughout the Navy. NAVMEP falls under the auspices of Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (OP-01), who reviews manpower determination recommendations received from the Naval Manpower Engineering Center (NAVMEC) located in Norfolk, Va. The NAVMEP has four broad categories:

- (1) The Shore Manpower Document (SHMD) Program.
- (2) The Commercial Activities Program.

(3) The Ship Manpower Document (SMD) Program.

(4) The Squadron Manpower Document (SQMD) Program.

[Ref. 12]

The following analysis will consider the SHMD, SMD, and SQMD Programs, as well as how each relates to the NSW manpower requirements.

## B. BACKGROUND

In order to provide a meaningful management tool, the Shore Requirements, Standards, and Manpower Planning System (SHORSTAMPS) was developed as a pilot program during the summer of 1972 through the joint efforts of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-01C) and the Navy Manpower and Material Analysis Centers, Atlantic (NAVMMACLANT) and Pacific (NAVMMACPAC). By March 1976, the SHORSTAMPS programs had been fully endorsed by the Chief of Naval Operations as the only approved approach for the Navy to determine and document manpower requirements in the shore support establishment. In addition to approving SHORSTAMPS as a program, the CNO authorized resources support for the program advancement and encouraged manpower sponsors to monitor and police workload and mobilization requirements. [Ref. 13]

Effective 1 July, 1984, SHORSTAMPS was redesignated as the Shore Manpower Document (SHMD) Program and placed under NAVMEC's cognizance. NAVMMACPAC and NAVMMACLANT were

abolished, with personnel from these commands being redistributed to one of eight Naval Manpower Engineering Center Detachments (NAVMECDET) located throughout the country. [Ref. 14]

#### C. SHORE MANPOWER DOCUMENT (SHMD) PROGRAM

Essentially, the SHMD Program is an application of industrial and management engineering principles for determining manpower requirements for the Navy shore establishments. The SHMD that is produced forms a basis for programming military billets and civilian positions which are reflected in the manpower authorization. [Ref. 15]

Other programs that attempt to correlate manning requirements with appropriate billets are the Ship Manpower Document Program and the Squadron Manpower Requirements Program.

#### D. SHIP MANPOWER DOCUMENT (SMD) PROGRAM

The SMD Program documents, by individual billet, the quantitative and qualitative manpower requirements to support accomplishment of all assigned missions and required operational capabilities in the designated environment. These requirements are published as OPNAV instructions and are referred to as Ship Manpower Documents (SMD's). [Ref. 16]

The methodology is predicated on data obtained through job task analysis, work study, activity sampling, and other

standard industrial engineering techniques. System input data are also obtained from the Navy Maintenance and Material Management (3-M) system. The analytical determination of shipboard enlisted manpower needs is based on analysis of the functional area and special conditions described below:

- (1) Operational manning is the manpower needed to man essential operating stations during specific readiness conditions of the ship such as general quarters or normal operational steaming underway as well as special evolutions such as flight quarters, underway replenishment, and 1A (amphibious operations). The determination of operational manning needs is based on Required Operational Capabilities (ROC's) assigned to the specific ship class by the appropriate OPNAV warfare sponsor. Detailed ROC's ensure objective determination of minimum watchstation requirements. Quality of ratings assigned to watchstations is determined by application of the Manual of Navy Enlisted Manpower and Personnel Classifications and Occupational Standards.
- (2) Maintenance manpower is the manpower needed to perform planned, corrective and facility maintenance. Requirements are determined through analysis of required maintenance actions generated through the Navy Maintenance and Material Management System. The 3-M system provides minimum skill levels of personnel, and time requirements for a given planned maintenance action. Total planned maintenance manpower requirements are mathematically determined by summing the requirements for individual equipments installed in the ship. Corrective maintenance manpower requirements are determined through application of ratios of planned maintenance to corrective maintenance. These various ratios are empirical in nature and based on data gathered by the Chief of Naval Material. [Ref. 17]

This program also includes other requirements specifically related to shipboard units, and addresses other



allowances such as participation in quarters and inspections, required proficiency training, fatigue and environmental efforts, and other time-consuming factors in computing total workload in the work week. The developed SMD then serves as the basis for the manpower authorization for the observed unit. [Ref. 18]

#### E. SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENT (SQMD) PROGRAM

The SQMD Program was initiated to provide a methodology for documenting manpower requirements in aircraft squadrons. The program provides a defensible technique for the determination of qualitative and quantitative billet requirements. These requirements are published as OPNAV instructions and are referred to as Squadron Manpower Documents (SQMD's). The SQMD is used as the basis for billet requirements identified in manpower authorizations for aircraft squadrons. All aircraft squadrons, including training and speciality squadrons, are included in the SQMD Program. SQMD's are published for identically equipped squadrons as "class documents" e.g., the manpower requirements for all RH-53D squadrons are identical and are identified in one SQMD. Unique squadrons have individual SQMD's. [Ref. 19]

The primary factors considered in the development of an SQMD are statements known as the Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) and the Projected Operational Environment

(POE). The ROC provides a precise definition of the squadron's mission statements. The POE is a description of the specific operating scenario in which the squadron is expected to operate in a wartime environment. [Ref. 20]

Various types of quantitative data are required to produce an SQMD. The major emphasis is placed on determining the planned maintenance and the corrective maintenance man-hours that will be required for the type and number of aircraft, sortie length and utilization rate. Planned maintenance man-hours are extracted from Maintenance Requirements Cards for the particular type and model aircraft. Corrective maintenance is computed, based upon the amount of work that is predicted to be necessary at the given level of flight activity. Data extracted from the 3-M data bank at the Maintenance Support Office, Mechanicsburg, PA, are analyzed in order to forecast the man-hours of corrective maintenance that will be required for the scenario specified in the POE. [Ref. 21]

#### F. SEAL TEAM SITUATION

Seal team's are shore-based commands located at San Diego, California, and Little Creek, Virginia. Although the commands as a whole do not deploy, they train and deploy platoons to different parts of the world, which is operationally similar to an aviation squadron.

Seal team is currently required to support itself in its departments using team operators. It is also required to support temporary additional duty (TAD) requirements such as the Navy parachute team, base security, and provide staff personnel for operational exercises in areas such as Korea, Alaska, and Florida throughout the year. It also supports administrative demonstrations for high-ranking military and civilian dignitaries from foreign countries as well as the U.S. when they visit the area, and for community sponsored programs such as the 4th of July demonstration. Seal team must also train its own personnel in advanced small unit tactics, demolitions, diving, and other areas unique to Seal Team operations. Also, there are usually 10 to 20 people TAD to various schools for additional training outside the immediate Seal team areas at any given time. Additionally, any research, development, and technical evaluation (RDT&E) that involves Navy Special Warfare must be manned by Seal Team operators to properly evaluate the new equipment.

These TAD requirements are mentioned to emphasize the unusual additional manning requirements imposed upon Seal team from external and internal forces, which affects manning and subsequently the stability of platoons and departments within the organization. This situation is unique when compared to a ship, for example. Although a ship may have internal TAD requirements to maintain adequately trained personnel, it would not have to give up

additional shipboard personnel to supplement a staff during an exercise, because a staff is already designed and manned to support the ship. Seal team is theoretically supported by the NSW group staffs, but these staffs are woefully undermanned for their required functions and consequently must be supplemented by Seal team personnel throughout the year for things such as operational exercises. Also, ships do not have "permanent" TAD assignments; that is, personnel from the ship assigned for up to two years TAD. Seal team is required to support the Navy parachute teams with qualified Seal operators for up to two years, further detracting from the manpower assigned to each team.

As previously discussed, Seal team operators man the departments that support the operational platoons. Their duties include time-consuming activities such as the maintenance of weapons, diving equipment, and small boats and motors. Personnel also order ammunition and explosives, check in and out equipment on a daily basis, and prepare equipment for platoon's preparing to deploy. Although these duties are often not that difficult, they are time consuming and require different training than personnel assigned to platoons. Proper performance of departmental functions is directly related to the efficiency of platoon operations. These duties are mentioned to emphasize that adequate departmental manning is essential to ensure equipment is

maintained properly, thus affecting the operational capabilities of the Seal team platoons.

One of the problems inherent in having Seal operators manning the departments is that they may be required to participate in Seal functions such as parachuting in a demonstration or supplementing staff during exercises. Also, their primary NEC or Rating may have nothing to do with the department in which they work. For example, a Boatswain's Mate (BM) may be working in the communications department because there is no function in Seal Team for a BM. This is not to say that the individual assigned will not eventually perform adequately in the communications department once he has received training in this field, but once again emphasizes that departments would support the platoon more effectively if the departmental personnel were fully qualified in their respective fields.

The current concern for adequate departmental manning is a result of the fact that in Seal team, just as in the rest of the Armed Services, equipment is getting much more complex and sophisticated, and as a result it requires more expertise and experience by personnel working on current systems and equipment than it ever has in the past. Technology is quickly advancing and equipment that is not maintained properly may cost thousands of dollars for additional acquisition and, if damaged, may not be replaced--which could seriously affect the operational



capabilities of platoons. Consequently, proper manning is essential to maintain the platoon's operational capabilities.

#### G. MANPOWER COMPARISONS

Although SHORSTAMPS has been in existence since 1976, no task analysis has ever been conducted at the Seal teams, so no SHMD has been developed. Nor should it be under the SHMD program, for the SHMD developed using shore based criteria would not properly represent the manning requirements of the Seal teams.

The information presented on the preceding pages indicates a modified version of the Squadron Manpower Requirements Program could be applied to the development of Seal team's manning requirements.

The Squadron Manpower Requirements Program documents manpower requirements based upon statements of mission tasking known as the Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) and Projected Operational Capabilities (POE) developed by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare). The ROC/POE represents squadron tasking in terms of mission area, type and quantity of aircraft, flight hour utilization, flight crew composition, student load, and other quantified factors. [Ref. 22]

Seal team's also have ROC/POE based on mission area, types of equipment used (i.e. open, closed, semi-closed



scuba), and skill factors involved with each type of equipment (i.e. how often an individual must dive using each type of scuba to maintain qualifications).

The SQMD process involves the computation of weekly workload as driven by tasking provided in the ROC/POE. This workload is then divided by the productive work hours available in a week to derive the quantity of billets required on a work-center basis. Workload is categorized as preventive maintenance (PM), corrective maintenance (CM), administrative support (AS), facilities maintenance (FM), utilities tasks (UT), directed manning (DM), and officer manning (OM). [Ref. 23]

The SQMD program has determined that the documented PM and CM workload by itself does not adequately describe the total effort expended by a work center in performing its required PM and CM. Allowances known as Production Delay (PD), Make Ready/Put Away (MR/PA), and Productivity Allowance (PA) are added to PM and CM in order to account for otherwise not included factors such as fatigue, non-availability of aircraft, environmental effects, personal needs, changing work areas, awaiting technical assistance, inclement weather and transportation. [Ref 24]

The reason the SQMD is so much more pertinent to Seal team's is that an aircraft squadron is basically broken down into two separate divisions--the flight division and the

maintenance division. Seal team's are basically the same way. The platoons use the equipment to perform their missions in accordance with the ROC/POE, and the departments are supposed to assist them in preparing the equipment prior to the missions and maintaining the equipment between missions. The labor standards addressed in forming the SQMD can be directly associated with Seal team's required standards. However, although planned and corrective maintenance is fairly appropriate for Seal team equipment, a Seal team does not have any large, extremely complicated equipment that requires major overhauls such as aircraft. Consequently, the PM calculation of the SQMD is most pertinent. Raw PM is calculated for each work center by using the following formula:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{PM} = & (\# \text{ aircraft}) (\text{PM per week per aircraft}) + \\ & (\# \text{ sorties per week}) (\text{PM per sortie}) + \\ & (\text{flight hours per week}) (\text{PM per flight hour}) + \\ & (\# \text{ aircraft}) (\text{PM per day per aircraft}) \\ & (\text{number of days per week}) \quad [\text{Ref. 25}] \end{aligned}$$

Total PM for each work center is calculated by adding MR/PA (30%), PA (20%), and PD (variable by environment and work center) using the following:

$$\text{Total PM} = (\text{raw PM} \times (1 + \text{MR/PA})) \times (1 + (\text{PA} + \text{PD})) \quad [\text{Ref. 26}]$$

These percentages of variables known as production delay (PD), make ready/put away (MR/PA), and productivity

allowance (PA) are based on empirical data within the aircraft-squadron community. These percentages would probably not be relevant to a Seal team, but the variables are definitely relevant. Using these variables, an analysis could be done to determine the relevant percentages for a Seal team. These variables could be determined through empirical data based on close observation and then adjusted to fit a Seal team's department manning requirements. Another factor that must be considered is the desired training for platoon personnel in each department. Whereas the flight crews turn the aircraft over to the maintenance people both in the U. S. and while deployed, Seal platoon personnel must be able to perform all departmental functions because the departments do not deploy with the platoons, and consequently the workload that is computed for PM must consider the platoon personnel doing a majority of the work. Also, the raw PM would not have as many factors in it and consequently would look something like the following:

$$\text{PM} = (\text{equipment (such as scuba)}) (\text{PM per hour per use}) +$$
$$(\# \text{ training missions per week}) (\text{equipment used}$$
$$\text{per training mission})$$

This would give a good indication of how much time should be spent on each piece of equipment.

In addition to direct labor standards associated with the SQMD, indirect labor standards and directed manning also

reflected in the SQMD are pertinent to Seal teams. Indirect labor must be computed to account for administrative workload, facilities maintenance, watch requirements, and supervision. Directed manning billets are required in squadrons but are not derived directly by workload. One example is career counselor.

#### H. CONCLUSION

In summary, a Seal team as it is operating today is inadequate in terms of its departments supporting platoon personnel. An analysis of job requirements per department should be conducted and standards should be established based upon on-site measurement using industrial-engineering survey techniques. Once these standards are established, it should be determined what the best mix of Seal team operators and regular Navy specialists is per department. Of the existing models, the SQMD seems to be the model that could best predict the manpower requirements for a Seal team, specifically addressing the departmental requirements to best support the platoons. Using this model, empirical data should now be gathered coupled with on-site surveys to determine which formulas from the SQMD methodology is best suited for Seal Team manning requirements.

### III. BILLET STRUCTURES

#### A. BACKGROUND

In the absence of an SHMD developed by the manpower engineering experts, the NSW community has been using a Manpower Authorization Form. The SMD, SQMD or SHMD developed by the manpower experts is designed to serve as the basis for the Manpower Authorization (MPA) (OPNAV 1000/2) [Ref. 27]. The chief of naval operations (DCNO manpower, personnel, and training)) provides the overall management of rating structures and approves or disapproves requests for billet changes [Ref. 28]. The individual under DCNO located at code OP-132 CO is the NSW enlisted community manager (ECM) and is responsible for managing the NSW's MPA.

Because no SHMD has been developed, and because the teams historically have been expanded and contracted as the needs of the Navy have dictated (i.e. expanded during hostile times such as WWII, Korea, and Vietnam, and contracted immediately following), no standard MPA has been established for individual teams. Also, as the teams have evolved, the mission has changed, exacerbating the problem of standardization.

Today, however, with the redesignation of the UDT teams to Seal teams, and the establishment of the SDV teams, the time is ripe to standardize team organization. The ECM, in



conjunction with the NSW groups and the Seal and SDV teams, has established by paygrade, the organization required to meet the team's operational commitments and effectively maintain the departments equipment.

#### B. GROWTH

To achieve this standardization, each NSW command was asked to update its MPA by the NSW ECM, and to justify any changes or additions. The modifications were then collated by the NSW ECM, who submitted the aggregate increases to CNO in the Manpower Planned Objectives Memorandum (POM) for 1986 (which covers the fiscal years 1986-1990). The CNO subsequently approved the requested increases for POM 86.

[Ref. 29]

MPA modification is normally a very lengthy process that sometimes takes years to approve by CNO. However the NSW request was accelerated because of a recent policy memorandum from the Deputy of the Secretary of Defense directing the services to revitalize special operations forces as a matter of national urgency. Included in that directive was a tasking to complete necessary force structure expansion by the end of the fiscal year 1990.

[Ref. 30] Table 1 portrays the 1984 approved billet structure and the approved expansion, by pay grade, in aggregate numbers of the NSW community. Table 1 also depicts the approved growth of other Navy enlisted personnel



(not Seal qualified) to man equipment, such as communication vans owned and used by the NSW community, and to support the team and the NSW-group staffs as they expand. [Ref. 31]

TABLE 1

BILLET STRUCTURE AND GROWTH FOR THE NSW COMMUNITY

| Item                               | E-9 | E-8 | E-7 | E-6 | E-5 | E-4 and<br>below | TOTAL |
|------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------------|-------|
| FY 84 Billets                      | 19  | 30  | 98  | 212 | 307 | 432              | 1098  |
| Approved POM 86<br>Operator Growth | 21  | 35  | 80  | 120 | 132 | 85               | 473   |
| Total NSW Operators<br>by FY 90    | 40  | 65  | 178 | 332 | 439 | 517              | 1571  |
| Support Growth<br>(Non-operators)  | 4   | 11  | 34  | 108 | 143 | 207              | 507   |

Note: Numbers indicate the authorized billets per paygrade

### C. EFFECTS OF GROWTH

The planned expansion will immediately effect the Naval Special Warfare Training Department (NSWTD) at the Naval Amphibious School in Coronado, California. The NSWTD conducts the basic Seal training where classes convene five times a year. Table 2 illustrates the number of graduates and the attrition rates from basic Seal training. [Ref. 32] As depicted in Table 2, the attrition rate for the last four fiscal years is 57% for enlisted personnel reporting to the NSWTD for training.

TABLE 2

NUMBER OF GRADUATES AND ATTRITION RATES FOR  
ENLISTED PERSONNEL WHO REPORTED TO NSWTD  
FOR BASIC SEAL TRAINING FOR FY81-FY84

| Item                    | FY-81 | FY-82 | FY-83 | FY-84* | TOTAL |
|-------------------------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|
| Reported to NSWTD       | 188   | 225   | 272   | 304    | 989   |
| Graduated From<br>NSWTD | 79    | 115   | 123   | 122    | 439   |
| Attrition Rate          | 58%   | 49%   | 55%   | 60%    | 57%   |

\*FY-84 data only available for four classes

In order to fill the approved billets in FY's 86-90 more graduates are required from the NSWTD. Table 3 estimates the number of graduates required to achieve the approved growth in the NSW community [Ref. 33]

TABLE 3

REQUIRED ENLISTED GRADUATES FROM NSWTD  
FOR FY'S 86-90

| FY-86 | FY-87 | FY-88 | FY-89 | FY-90 |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 188   | 272   | 313   | 303   | 318   |

Consequently the first billets to be filled in the expansion process will be the ones requested by the NSWTD. The training department will hopefully then be able to increase class size without deleteriously affecting the quality of instruction and/or increase the number of classes convened each year. Of course other resources such as

barracks, classrooms, consumables, and technical and support equipment will also be needed, but additional money (which has already been approved) will alleviate those problems. The biggest problem is ensuring instructor manpower requirements are met so that the quality of instruction does not deteriorate as the number of students increases.

The remaining growth will encompass the existing Seal and SDV Teams the NSW group staffs, and an additional Seal team which will begin manning requirements in FY-88.

#### D. APPROVED SEAL COMMAND STRUCTURE

Table 4 depicts the approved structure by paygrade for Seal teams for NSW operators and support personnel to be achieved by FY-90 [Ref. 34].

TABLE 4

| APPROVED BILLET STRUCTURE FOR SEAL TEAMS |     |     |     |     |                  |       |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------------|-------|
| E-9                                      | E-8 | E-7 | E-6 | E-5 | E-4 and<br>below | TOTAL |
| NSW OPERATORS                            |     |     |     |     |                  |       |
| 4  | 7   | 15  | 22  | 54  | 58               | 160   |
| SUPPORT PERSONNEL                        |     |     |     |     |                  |       |
| -  | -   | 3   | 8   | 4   | 5                | 20    |

The Seal teams comprise the majority of NSW operators. Other commands that also possess a significant number of Seal Operators are the SDV teams, The Naval Special Warfare

groups, and the Naval Special Warfare Training Department of the Naval Amphibious School in Coronado, California. But, as previously mentioned, this study focuses primarily on the Seal teams, for the skills developed at Seal team will be used at the other commands.

The support personnel identified in Table 1 serve the team in different capacities. They are assigned to departments either to provide expertise that NSW operators do not possess, or provide stability in departments and assist the Seals in preparing and maintaining equipment. Supply and Administrative Departments are an example of the former, for Seals don't have the training to effectively run these departments. A Parachute Rigger (PR) assigned to the Air Department to maintain records and parachutes, and assist platoon riggers preparing for operations is an example of the latter. For although Seals have the training and expertise to run this department, the stability of the department, and subsequently the platoons and the team, is enhanced significantly when assigning a non-Seal to this department full time.

#### IV. ESTABLISHING AN NSW RATING

##### A. BACKGROUND

The idea of creating a Naval Special Warfare rating is not new. On 12 August 1974, a Special Warfare workshop was held at the Naval Amphibious Base in Coronado, California. Participants included representatives of Pacific and Atlantic Fleets, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Bureau of Personnel (now Naval Military Personnel Command), and Occupational Standards Department Personnel. After consideration of the pros and cons of adopting separate ratings for the Naval Special Warfare community within the context of the new Naval Enlisted Occupational Standards (NEOCS) proposal, it was the unanimous decision of the workshop attendees that a separate rating should not be created. [Ref. 35]

##### B. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

The workshop addressed the rating proposal by evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of creating a rating. The following are the basic arguments that were addressed and evaluated.

###### Advantages:

1. Personnel would be employed and advance in the same occupational field, as opposed to the situation now existing, where personnel are primarily used in

Special Warfare functions but must advance in the "parent" rating.

2. A Special Warfare rating would be consistent with the rest of the entire new NEOCS concept.

Disadvantages:

1. An occupational field devoted exclusively to Special Warfare would be relatively small in size and thus would severely restrict advancement opportunities to senior paygrade levels. Present senior petty officers would numerically exceed the probable authorizations thus E-7s, E-6s, etc, would be frozen and could not advance until vacancies were created.
2. The field of "Special Warfare" requires a broad spectrum of enlisted occupational skills now being supplied by personnel in the various ratings. Extreme difficulty would be experienced in getting these skills into a single rating. These essential skills would have to be identified by Navy Enlisted Classifications (NEC), which would require a major expansion in the Special Warfare NECs.
3. The present system (i.e., utilizing personnel of all ratings) provides a degree of flexibility and mobility essential to the functioning of the Special Warfare organization. Trained and skilled personnel in various ratings are now recruited into the Force and provide essential training in Special Forces matters. Various levels of experience can be recruited. Conversely, if a person becomes disqualified for any reason, that person can now be returned to his "parent" rating and can be utilized therein. With the establishment of an exclusive rating this flexibility would be lost; "drop-outs" would have to have relatively long training to be fully usable in the Navy in another field.
4. Retention and career enhancement would suffer through a combination of the factors cited above.  
[Ref. 36]

C. ADVANCEMENT PROCEDURES

After the 12 August, 1974 meeting creation of a Seal rating again surfaced in 1975 because of the concern



regarding advancement for enlisted personnel serving permanently outside their present rating. In the case of UDT and Seal enlisted personnel, studies determined that they were at a competitive disadvantage for advancement. Therefore advancement procedures were modified somewhat for E-4, E-5, and E-6 UDT and Seal personnel. Initially they would be regarded as nonspecial candidates within the competing group of their rate and rating under the normal enlisted advancement system. Processing would be complete for members who were designated selectees at this point. But, if the UDT or Seal member passed but did not advance (PNA'd) as a result of the exam score ranking within the USN competing group, the individual would be reprocessed. If the member was then included within the following upper percentages of the competing group on the advancement exam for his rating he would be designated a selectee:

| <u>E-4</u> | <u>E-5</u> | <u>E-6</u> |
|------------|------------|------------|
| 69%        | 50%        | 42%        |

These special E-4/5/6 processing procedures gave Seal and UDT personnel two "looks" for possible advancement selection vice the normal one. [Ref. 37] This advancement procedure was instituted to rectify any disadvantages that enlisted Seals had when competing for advancement. It is still in effect today.

#### D. RECENT INTEREST

The most recent interest in the creation of an NSW rating came from the Chief of Naval Personnel in September of 1978. Once again the concern arose regarding the possibility that the NSW enlisted community is at a disadvantage when competing within their source ratings for advancement, so advancement opportunities along with billet structure and career potential was again reviewed.

[Ref. 38]

The advancement process and advantages and disadvantages of establishing a rating were again reviewed. The conclusion was once again that the NSW community advancement examinations be monitored for equity and that an NSW rating not be established. Arguments against creating an NSW rating again concentrated on advancement stagnation, and noted that personnel attriting would require retraining into another skill, and also included an NSW personnel survey administered by the Navy Occupational Development and Analysis Center in 1976/77 that indicated that overall NSW job satisfaction was higher than the Navy's average, that perception of advancement opportunities was good, and that inclination toward a military career was higher than the Navy average. [Ref. 39]

## E. UPDATING AND EVALUATING ARGUMENTS

Although one can understand the concern that establishing a rating would result in advancement stagnation, this concern would be mitigated somewhat by the recent approved expansion of NSW forces by FY 90. As illustrated in Table 1 the number of authorized billets for E-7/8/9 has almost doubled. Additionally, over 30 ratings in the Navy have 1500 or fewer personnel authorized, so the NSW rating would not be unique regarding size within the Navy [Ref. 40].

Stagnation is a very real concern, however, especially when analyzing the reenlistment rates of the NSW community, for reenlistment rates directly effect the advancement opportunities of enlisted personnel. Table 5 compares reenlistment rates for FY 82/82/84 for all the Navy and the NSW community [Ref. 41].

TABLE 5

NSW AND ALNAV REENLISTMENT RATES  
for FY 82/83/84

| YEAR  | TERM     | NSW  | ALNAV |
|-------|----------|------|-------|
| FY 82 | 1st Term | 55.9 | 50.3  |
|       | 2nd Term | 66.7 | 63.0  |
|       | 3rd Term | 92.1 | 95.3  |
| FY 83 | 1st Term | 75.8 | 54.5  |
|       | 2nd Term | 83.7 | 66.3  |
|       | 3rd Term | 100  | 95.4  |
| FY 84 | 1st Term | 81.6 | 58.0  |
|       | 2nd Term | 88.9 | 64.4  |
|       | 3rd Term | 97.8 | 94.9  |

NSW Reenlistment percentages for 1st and 2nd term enlisted personnel are much higher than the rest of the Navy. These high percentages will definitely exacerbate the advancement stagnation situation once the expansion is complete in FY 90, but they are presently required in order to achieve the approved manning growth depicted in Table 1. Also, although the 2nd and 3rd term ALNAV reenlistment rate is fairly steady, an increasing reenlistment percentage is apparent for 1st term enlisted personnel. This indicates that fewer promotions are taking place throughout the Navy. Table Six compares the percentages of E-4/5/6 advanced in calendar year 1980 and calendar year 1983 throughout the Navy [Ref. 42].

TABLE 6

ALNAV ADVANCEMENT RATES FOR E-4/5/6 PERSONNEL  
FOR CY80 AND CY83

| YEAR | E-4 | E-5 | E-6 |
|------|-----|-----|-----|
| CY80 | 92% | 55% | 47% |
| CY83 | 60% | 30% | 40% |

This downward trend in advancements could deleteriously effect the NSW community because it needs growth in the E-4/5/6 rates, not reduction. Because an NSW rating does not exist the NSW ECM does not have any control over the advancements of NSW enlisted personnel. If he did he could increase the percentage of advancements of enlisted

personnel to meet the NSW community manpower requirements. With the current system he can only hope that enough enlisted personnel advance in their parent rating to achieve the NSW manpower goals. This lack of control over NSW enlisted advancements limits the ECM's authority and flexibility while attempting to manage the NSW manpower needs.

The argument that the NSW field requires a broad spectrum of enlisted occupational skills is exactly why an NSW rating should be created, not why it should not. As previously mentioned the degree of sophistication of equipment is constantly increasing and therefore the technical manuals that NSW personnel use regularly should be the basis for the books that would be studied in preparation for advancement examinations. Enlisted personnel's primary and secondary NEC's would encompass skills developed from schools and/or on the job training in particular departments such as the air department, and the individual would become a specialist in one or two fields while maintaining proficiency in all facets of NSW operations. This procedure of specializing in one or two fields while maintaining overall NSW proficiency is already the procedure used by Seal teams, and establishing a rating would therefore not alter current procedure. It would formally endorse the current procedure. Furthermore, it would establish incentive for enlisted personnel to thoroughly understand

all facets of each department, because the examinations would be developed from procedures and skills required in each department. The current procedure does not provide this incentive, for enlisted personnel are never tested for advancement purposes on information and procedures required for each department.

The next basic disadvantage of a Seal rating addressed flexibility and disqualification. Although the utilization of personnel from various ratings may have at one time increased the degree of flexibility and mobility in the NSW organization, this idea is now obsolete due to the degree of specialization required not only in the NSW community but throughout the Navy. If an individual attends an "A" school designed to prepare him for learning the skills associated with a particular rating such as Electricians Mate (EM), Quarter Master (QM) or Storekeeper (SK), and he never or seldom uses these skills once assigned to the NSW community, it is not only a waste of time for the community, it is only a waste of time for the individual to learn these skills, and it is a waste of time and money for the Navy. Very few enlisted personnel report to the NSWTD for basic Seal training directly from the recruit training commands (RTC). Most all come from fleet and shore activities, or directly from "A" school [Ref. 43]. If an individual is qualified for an "A" school prior to enlisting, he will naturally



choose to attend. If he's not guaranteed transfer to the NSWTD upon completion of "A" school, he will be sent to a command. Once at the command, a request must be sent to his detailer via the chain of command to approve his transfer to Seal training. About 50% of the enlisted personnel that report to the NSWTD are from fleet or shore commands [Ref. 44]. Because the request to Seal training must be approved through the individual's chain of command, a fully qualified individual may not be able to attend Seal training because the command disapproves the request for reasons inherent to the command (i.e. manpower shortages). Consequently this procedure actually reduces the flexibility associated with ensuring enough people begin Seal training because the number of graduates from training is directly related to the number of enlisted personnel commencing training. This procedure may also deleteriously effect the expansion requirements approved by CNO, because the number of enlisted personnel reporting to the NSWTD for training will have to increase to achieve the NSWTD graduate goals illustrated in Table 3.

The point regarding the current system's ability to return a disqualified person to his parent rating, and therefore circumvent the long time required for retraining, is weak. If an NSW rating was created more enlisted personnel would proceed directly from RTC's and forego "A"

school. This would eliminate the cost to the Navy of sending individuals to "A" schools to learn skills they may never use if they become members of the NSW community. If, however, that individual dropped out of Seal training he could then proceed to an "A" school and continue his Navy career. If an individual became a Seal and later became disqualified he would have to be retrained, but so do individuals who become disqualified for security or health reasons in other Navy ratings. Again, the NSW rating would not be unique within the Navy. A reduction in recruiting experienced personnel from the fleet would not occur if an NSW rating was established. Individuals who are already designated in other ratings could request lateral transfers to the NSW rating list. This is basically the same methodology currently used, i.e., putting a request in through the chain of command.

If the NSW enlisted personnel perceive that creating an NSW rating would be injurious to their careers, retention may in fact suffer. Changing the status quo in any organization usually results in apprehension and feelings of uneasiness among those effected. A full understanding by the enlisted personnel of the need to establish a rating through briefings and positive leadership would have to accompany any change in the current situation.

## F. RATING SUPPORT

If an NSW rating is to come into existence, there must be support for it from senior officers within the NSW community. If there is no support within the NSW community, then the only way the rating will exist is if senior naval officers outside the NSW community voice concern about the lack of a rating and initiate action to rectify the situation. Currently there is no support from within the NSW community for a rating nor is there concern outside the community. [Ref. 46]

This lack of concern outside the NSW community is probably due to the small amount of personnel involved. For example, as illustrated in Table 1, NSW was authorized 147 E-7/8/9 billets in FY 84. These billets are spread out over 28 source, or parent, ratings [Ref. 46]. Although the E-7/8/9 billets are not necessarily distributed evenly within these ratings, one can see that the average number of NSW chiefs in a particular authorized source rating is a little over five. This consequently does not cause tremendous concern with the flag officers who manage the Navy. It does cause concern with the ECM's that manage those particular source ratings, however, because they have no control over the management of Seals in their rating. For example, if the ECM for the Quartermaster (QM) rating, an authorized source rating for NSW enlisted personnel, is authorized 200 E-7/8/9 billets, and five are Seals, he cannot designate

these five Seals to fill billets in the fleet QM's. He also cannot request five additional fleet QM's get promoted to fill the vacancies, because then he would be overmanned in the QM rating. It is a catch-22 cycle that will be rectified only when an NSW rating is established.

Another reason flag officers may not push for an NSW rating is the cost of creating and maintaining a rating. It takes 3-5 years to establish a rating, and it takes many man hours to research and develop the occupational standards manuals and tests that are required to accompany the establishment of a new rating. [Ref. 47] Consequently the numbers may not be great enough to warrant concern with top Navy managers when analyzing and evaluating the costs associated with creating an NSW rating.

Top Navy officials may begin to voice concern once all the approved NSW billets are filled in FY 90. As Table 1 indicates the number of E-7/8/9 billets almost doubles, and this increase in billets may really become conspicuous if a concomitant growth in enlisted billets is not experienced within the NSW authorized source ratings.

## V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The time is right to initiate procedures for developing a NSW rating. The evolutionary process of Naval Special Warfare (NSW) has been completed, and the manpower requirements for the Seal and Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (SDV) teams have been developed. This development of manpower requirements is only in the first stage, however. The standards that have been established are based on the experience of senior officers within the NSW community. The next stage is for the experts from the NAVMEP to reinforce the standards established by NSW officers by establishing NSW manpower requirements using industrial and engineering principles. If the creation of an NSW rating was approved by the Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC), it would probably require that NAVMEP analyze the NSW community's manpower requirements in the near future by increasing the priority of NSW.

If procedures for a NSW rating were initiated now it would take 3-5 years before the rating was actually established. If the NSW reenlistment continues to remain at its current high percentage, as illustrated in Table 5, and the number graduates from the NSWTD increases by increasing class sizes or number of classes per year, the NSW community's increase in manpower requirements illustrated in

Table 1 should be met. Consequently the establishment of the NSW rating would coincide with the NSW community being fully manned, which would be the perfect time for the senior NSW officers to take full management control of the NSW community.

As equipment becomes more sophisticated, more difficult to repair, and more costly to replace, the need for a rating will increase. The operational equipment in NSW is continuing to increase in complexity. Any time an enlisted man studies information not related to NSW equipment and procedures, he is wasting his time and the Navy's. Additionally, the establishment of a rating would motivate the enlisted man to maintain qualifications in all facets of NSW operations. The advancement manuals and tests would reflect the procedures required for each department within the team. Consequently the more information an individual had about all facets of NSW operations, the better his chances of passing the examination and becoming advanced.

Additionally, personnel would be evaluated against one another within the rating, which would allow the top performers to advance first. Currently an individual could be the best performer in the team, but because he is in a technical rating such as radioman, and never works within his rating, he scores poorly on the written examinations and consequently is not advanced. Having a NSW rating would eliminate this injustice and allow the personnel with the



best leadership and knowledge of NSW operations to advance first.

If a rating is to come into existence it will have to have the wholehearted backing of NSW officers. Positive leadership with a thorough understanding of the advantages of creating a rating must accompany the change if it is to come about.

Stagnation within the rating may never be a problem, and definitely will not be until the expanded manpower requirements are met. Even then, stagnation within the community will result only if the community is not well managed. Personnel should be evaluated according to their abilities and when they request reenlistment their records should be carefully reviewed by commanding officers before a positive recommendation is given. NSW officers must be prepared to make difficult decisions which may entail not recommending a man for reenlistment or promotion, and then stick by that decision. NSW officers should be prepared to take full managerial control of the NSW community, and creating a rating will give them that control.

## APPENDIX A

### Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AR ----- Arithmetic Reasoning Test

ASVAB ----- Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery

CNO ----- Chief of Naval Operations

ECM ----- Enlisted Community Manager

MPA ----- Manpower Authorization

•

NAVMMACLANT -- Navy Manpower and Material Analysis Center,  
Atlantic

NAVMMACPAC -- Navy Manpower and Material Analysis Center,  
Pacific

NAVMEC ----- Naval Manpower Engineering Center

NAVMECDET ---- Naval Manpower Engineering Center Detachment

NAVMEP ----- Naval Manpower Engineering Program

NEC ----- Navy Enlisted Classification

NMPC ----- Naval Military Personnel Command

NSW ----- Naval Special Warfare

NSWTD ----- Naval Special Warfare Training Department of  
the Naval Amphibious School, Coronado,  
California

OP - 01 ----- Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower,  
Personnel, Training)

OP - 132C10 -- Enlisted Community Manager for Naval Special  
Warfare

PNEC ----- Primary Navy Enlisted Classification

POE ----- Projected Operational Environment

POM ----- Planned Objectives Memorandum

PQS ----- Personnel Qualification System  
ROC ----- Required Operational Capability  
SDV ----- Swimmer Delivery Vehicle  
SHMD ----- Shore Manpower Document  
SHORSTAMPS --- Shore Requirments, Standards, and Manpower  
Planning System  
SMD ----- Ship Manpower Document  
SNEC ----- Secondary Navy Enlisted Classification  
SQMD ----- Squadron Manpower Document  
UDT ----- Underwater Demolition Team  
WK ----- Word Knowledge Test

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